This paper develops a DSGE model to examine the quantitative macroeconomic implications of counter-cyclical fiscal policy for France, Germany and the UK. The model incorporates real wage rigidity and consumption habits, as the particular market failures justifying policy intervention. We subject the model to productivity shocks and allow policy instruments to react to the output gap and the debt-to-output ratio. A welfare analysis reveals that the most effective instrument-target combination is to use public consumption to stabilize the output gap. Moreover, welfare gains from counter-cyclical fiscal policy are much stronger in the presence of wage rigidities compared with consumption habits. Finally, since active policy and automatic stabilizers are substitutes, it is possible that relatively undistorted economies may be in need of countercyclical fiscal action due to inadequate automatic stabilizers. Abstract This paper develops a DSGE model to examine the quantitative macroeconomic implications of counter-cyclical …scal policy for France, Germany and the UK. The model incorporates real wage rigidity and consumption habits, as the particular market failures justifying policy intervention. We subject the model to productivity shocks and allow policy instruments to react to the output gap and the debtto-output ratio. A welfare analysis reveals that the most e¤ective instrument-target combination is to use public consumption to stabilize the output gap. Moreover, welfare gains from counter-cyclical …scal policy are much stronger in the presence of wage rigidities compared with consumption habits. Finally, since active policy and automatic stabilizers are substitutes, it is possible that relatively undistorted economies may be in need of countercyclical …scal action due to inadequate automatic stabilizers.
Introduction
Despite the relative neglect of …scal compared to monetary policy since the 1970s, there has been somewhat of a revival in the interests of European policymakers and academics for countercyclical …scal stabilization policy (see, e.g. Andrés et al. (2008) , Andrés and Doménech (2006) , the papers in the CESifo Economic Studies (2005) volume and the theoretical papers on feedback …scal policy, e.g. Aloi et al. (2003) , Guo and Lansing (1998) and Leeper (1991) ). While most theorists seem to prefer the use of automatic stabilizers to active policy rules 1 , in practice, as pointed out by e.g. Galí (2005) above, policymakers do change their …scal policies when the economic fundamentals change.
In Europe, this is obviously related to the fact that monetary policy is no longer an option for individual countries, but also to the recent sustained slow growth in several European economies. At the same time, due to the conditions of the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), there have also been recommendations in Europe to correct public …nance imbalances by adding, for instance, the public debt-to-GDP ratio, or the budget de…cit-to-GDP ratio, to the set of fundamentals that …scal authorities should respond to. 2 This renewed interest in countercyclical …scal stabilization policy begs a number of important questions regarding which, if any, of the potential …scal instruments available to policymakers will be able to deliver the desired degree of macroeconomic stability. More importantly, will active relative to passive policy be welfare improving?
imply that the …scal authorities adjust their policy instruments to the economic situation, in a manner that is beyond the role played by automatic stabilizers. In an attempt to more closely replicate the output dynamics that appear in macroeconomic data, our model includes private and public capital adjustment costs, habit persistence in consumption and real wage rigidity. The latter is particularly relevant for Europe and is one of the market failures justifying policy intervention in our setup. 4 Our policy instruments include the three major items of public spending (public consumption, investment and transfers) as shares of output and the two main sources of tax revenues (income and consumption tax rates). The government's allocative role in our setup is the provision of public consumption services that augment household's utility and public investment that enhances public capital entering the …rm's production function. When modelling feedback policy, we allow policy instruments to respond to the cyclical state of the economy as measured by the output gap and the deviation of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from a 60% long-run level (which is the reference level of the SGP). When such countercyclical reaction is switched o¤, policymakers follow passive policy which in our setup is de…ned as automatic stabilization.
We next subject the model to a temporary stochastic productivity shock to evaluate the quantitative welfare implications of active versus passive policy. To conduct our general equilibrium welfare analysis, we …rst follow the linear-quadratic method introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . This approach requires that welfare be calculated using inputs approximated in the area of the optimal (i.e. social planner's) steady-state. However, we also use a more general measure, in which these inputs are approximated in the area of the non-optimal steady-state (i.e. a long-run that includes market and policy distortions). Using these two measures, we quantify welfare under active and passive policy and solve for a compensating consumption supplement that can make welfare equal in the two policy regimes (see, also e.g. Lucas (1990) ).
Our main …ndings are as follows. First, the dependence of tax rates on the output and debt volatility introduces local indeterminacy (i.e. expectationsdriven outcomes), at least for a large range of parameter values (see also e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) for the US). 5 Second, reaction to public
Households
The preferences of each household, indexed by the superscript h, are given by the intertemporal utility function:
where E 0 is the expectations operator; C h t is private consumption of household h at time t; C t 1 is average (per capita) lagged-once private consumption; L h t is the leisure time of household h at t; G c t is average consumption services provided by the government at t; 0 < 1 is a habit persistence parameter; and 0 < < 1 is the rate of time preference. In other words, utility depends positively on consumption relative to an external habit variable, where the latter is assumed to be proportional to average past consumption (see, e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003, and Christiano et al., 2005) , leisure time and public consumption services.
Instantaneous utility, U h t ; is increasing in its three arguments, concave and satis…es the Inada conditions. We employ the widely-used form:
where, 0 < 1 ; 2 ; (1 1 2 ) < 1 are the weights given to relative consumption, leisure time and public consumption services respectively, and > 1 is the degree of risk aversion. Each household can save in the form of capital, I 
where 0 < y t < 1 and 0 < c t < 1 are respectively the tax rates on income and private consumption at t. Private holdings of government bonds and capital grow according to the following evolution equations:
and
where 0 p 1 is a constant depreciation rate, p 0 captures internal adjustment costs on gross private investment, and I h =K h denotes the ratio of household's investment to capital in the long run (where this ratio will be stationary in equilibrium; see sub-section 2.5 below). Note that, in common with the RBC literature, adjustment costs will be zero in the long run.
Households act competitively by taking market prices, policy variables and economy-wide variables as given. Thus, each household h chooses fC 9 The …rst-order conditions include the constraints (3) (5); the optimality condition for labor supply, (6a), and the Euler-equations for private capital and government bonds (6b 6c) :
where 0 0 measures the degree of wage sluggishness and M RS t is given by (6a) above. The basic idea behind this partial adjustment model is that real wages respond only sluggishly to current conditions in the labor market. As pointed out by Blanchard and Galí (2007) , "this is a parsimonious way of modeling the slow adjustment of wages to labor market conditions, as found in a variety of models of real wage rigidities, without taking a stand on what is the 'right'model". In other words, although ad hoc, this speci…cation can be consistent with a number of possible sources of rigidity in European labor markets, e.g. institutional, legal and sociopolitical rigidities and safety nets, etc. Blanchard and Katz (1997) review the literature and provide empirical evidence that wages depend strongly on lagged wages. Finally, notice that this modeling has the following implications: (i) if = 0; the standard neoclassical model obtains; (ii) in the steady-state, i.e. when w t = w t 1 = w, it follows that again w = M RS:
Government
In per capita terms, the within-period government budget constraint is (as above, variables with an upper bar denote per capita quantities):
where G c t , G i t , and G tr t are respectively per capita government consumption, government investment and government transfers at t, and B t+1 is the endof-period per capita stock of bonds issued by the government. 12 Government investment, G i t , is used to augment the stock of public capital whose motion is given by (in per capita terms):
where 0 g 1 is a constant depreciation rate, g 0 captures adjustment costs on gross public investment, and G i =K g denotes the ratio of per capita public investment to public capital in the long run (where this ratio will be stationary in equilibrium; see sub-section 2.5 below). . Accordingly, small letters will denote quantities in per capita and e¢ ciency units. An exception is h t H t ; which is per capita work time. Also note that we de…ne a t A t . Our DCE derived in the previous sub-sections can now be rewritten in stationary form as follows:
Decentralized competitive equilibrium
(10a)
( 1 1 2 )(1 )
( 1 1 2 )(1 ) 
and where we de…ne: . In other words, the stationary DCE is de…ned by the above system of ten nonlinear stochastic di¤erence equations in fy t ; c t ; i t ; h t ; k t+1 ; k , whose evolution is explained in the next sub-section.
The motion of technology and …scal policy instruments
Following most of the RBC literature, we assume that the stochastic process determining a t is an exponential …rst-order Markov process
where a 0 > 0 is a constant, 0 < a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and " t iid(0;
2 ) are random shocks to productivity. Also following e.g. Guo and Lansing (1998) , is the most common indicator of economic activity, while the public debt-to-output ratio relative to its long-run value, bt=yt b=y , is an indicator of public …nances. 13 The value of b=y will be assumed to be 60% which is the reference value implicitly required by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Note that our feedback policy rules are also in accordance with Tanzi's suggestion (Tanzi, CESifo Forum, 3/2005, p. 64) that "countercyclical …scal policy should not be abandoned in depressions and it could be tried in milder slowdowns when the …scal accounts of a country are in good initial conditions". Note …nally that, despite the recent loosening of the SGP, national policymakers continue to take into account the …scal accounts and imbalances. 
where the constants g are feedback policy coe¢ cients, which can be positive, negative or zero depending on whether the policy instrument rate is used procyclically, countercyclically or acyclically. 16 Equations (10a j), jointly with equations (11) and (12a f ), summarize the stationary DCE. Its long-run solution and linearized version are in Appendices A and B respectively. 
Calibrated parameters
The parameters of our model and their calibrated values are listed in Table 1 . Average labour's share, 2 , is obtained directly from the ISDB dataset. An approximate value across our 3-countries of 0.6 has also been used by Smets 15 As said above, the ‡at over time output subsidy, s 0 , is zero, except in the RotembergWoodford type of welfare analysis conducted in subsection 5.3 below. The other policy constants are de…ned in subsection 3.2 below. 16 Given the inherent delays in the conduct of …scal policy in practice and the presence of habits in our model, we have also added a one-period lag to the standard setup adopted in the papers cited above. We will examine the welfare implications of the feedback rules both without and with the lag below.
and Wouters (2003) for the Euro Area aggregate. Private and public capital's shares, 1 and ( 1 1 2 ) respectively, are obtained by decomposing the implied aggregate capital share into private and public shares using average private and public investment shares from the EO database. Our implied values for the productivity of public capital, 0.053, 0.046, 0.015 for Germany, France and the U.K. respectively, are similar in magnitude to those found in, for example, Lansing (1998) for the US. Since we do not have data pertaining to capital adjustment costs and given that our speci…cation of these costs is based on Canova and De Nicoló (2002), we follow their study and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002) and set p = 2 for all countries. Note that in the absence of data, we adopt the convention of …xing the same parameter value across countries in order not to bias the subsequent results and analysis. In other words, when the appropriate data exists, we let it de…ne cross-country di¤erences in economic structure.
Given the relationship between the gross real rate of interest and the discount rate, i.e. (1 + r) = 1 , we use MEI data on ex-post real interest rates to imply the values of reported in Table 1 . In light of the lack of reliable depreciation rate data, following Smets and Wouters (2003), we set the private one to 10% per annum. 18 We also applied the same rate to public capital. In all cases, this contributed to producing reasonable private and public capital to output ratios, e.g. private: 2.12, 2.56, 2.47 and public: 0.31, 0.31, 0.10 for Germany, France, and the U.K. respectively.
Following Kydland (1995, ch. 5, p. 134), we use data on average hours worked, H, to imply the leisure weight in utility, 2 = 1 h, where h = H=(7 14 52) is the average share of the total time endowment allocated to work and H is obtained from the EO database. The normalization of H to obtain h follows Jorgenson (1995) and Correia et al. (1995) . 19 Our implied leisure weights reported in Table 1 are similar in magnitude to those found in other calibration studies, see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995) for the US. Given the lack of relevant data, we follow the study by Baier and Glomm (2001) setting the relative weight of public consumption services at (1 Finally, we obtain the wage persistence parameter, , via maximum likelihood estimation of (B:4) (see Appendix B) using real compensation data from the MEI and IFS databases and the data mentioned above for c t , h t , y t and c t . 20 To estimate (B:4), we take log deviations from an HP trend for each of the series and condition on the relevant calibrated parameters described above. All estimates of reported in Table 1 above are signi…cant at the 1% level. Our estimates of which range from 0.91 to 0.98 appear in line with others used in DSGE exercises. For example, Blanchard and Galí (2007) set the persistence parameter of lagged once real wage equal to 0.9 and Christo¤el and Linzert (2005) set it between 0.9 and 0.97.
Parameters for technology and the policy rules
In the subsequent analysis, we will consider shocks to productivity across countries. Given that the resulting volatility in macroeconomic aggregates depends on the size of the shock and the degree of persistence in the process driving technology, we normalize these parameters across countries. To understand the di¤erential e¤ects on volatility, we …x a at 0.95 and shock the standard deviation of technology, a , by 1%. Unless otherwise de…ned, the values of g Table 1 . 21 Data for the public spending as shares of output for each country are from EO. Data for income and consumption tax rates for each country are from the ECFIN paper by Martinez-Mongay (2000). The income rates reported in Table 1 are the weighted average of the e¤ective tax rates on gross capital and employed labour.
We now turn to the reaction coe¢ cients in the …scal policy instruments (see equations 12a; b). Based on the empirical …nding of Galí and Perotti (2005) and Claeys (2006) and the lack of other robust estimates, we will employ a range running from 0 to 0.2 for each country. Finally the AR parameters for the e¤ective tax rates, in (12d) were obtained using the ECFIN data. The estimates of for France, Germany and the U.K. respectively are: 0.944, 0.74 and 0.71 and are all signi…cant at the 1% level.
Model Evaluation
We next undertake an empirical assessment of the implications of our above calibration and key modelling choices (i.e. to include habits in consumption, wage rigidity and adjustment costs in private and public capital). To this end, we compare both the autocovariance and impulse response functions of our model to the data using the Watson (1993) and Christiano et al.
(2005) methods respectively. 22 Both measures are based on a comparison of an estimated VAR with our, in e¤ect, calibrated VAR. The baseline RBC 21 To be more precise: (i) the constants g is set either to the data average or to the value needed to undo a long-run distortion in the Rotemberg-Woodford welfare measure; and (iv) we set g tr 0 = 0 along the transition path (in the long run, where public debt is set to be 0.6 of output, g tr 0 becomes residually endogenous to satisfy the government budget constraint (see e.g. (A:10) in the Appendix). 22 Note that for this exercise, the values of the feedback parameters in various policy rules are set to zero. Once we establish our preferred model based on the data, we proceed in the next section to examine the welfare implications of the parameterized feedback policy rules. model (with government) is de…ned as a special case of our model without private and public capital adjustment costs, real wage rigidity and habits (i.e. = p = g = = 0). To understand the implications in terms of model …t, we move from this baseline to our full DCE model by adding back in the mechanisms which generate persistence and thus should have the e¤ect of capturing some of the inertia observed in the actual data.
The data VAR is estimated using annual data from 1970-2005. 23 To make the VAR model as parsimonious as possible, we estimate a system consisting of output, private investment, private consumption, and wages. Government expenditure (consumption and investment) is calculated using the accounting identity b
, and hours can be obtained from the relation
This is possible since we can still obtain the spectral density matrix for the data including output via the following transformation:
; F g;y;i;c;w;h (!) = UF y;i;c;w (!)U 0 ;
where ! c , ! i , and ! g are the average output weights of the three expenditure components calculated from the data. For the impulse-response matrix at lag , an equivalent transformation gives:
g;y;i;c;w;h ( ) = U y;i;c;w ( )U 0 :
Watson measure of …t
The Watson (1993) method allows us to compare characteristics of the actual data corresponding to our model with the data generated by our model. Watson points out, in the context of models which are calibrated, that it is important not to view the economic model as the data generating process, but rather as an approximation to it. The essence of Watson's approach is to determine the size of the stochastic error necessary to reconcile the model-generated covariances with the sample covariances.
To brie ‡y illustrate the main points of the approach, consider an (n 1) vector of stationary variables x t explained by an economic model, and its empirical counterpart y t , with covariance generating functions G x (z) and G y (z) respectively. Watson's method poses the following question, "How much error would have to be added to x t so that the autocovariances of x t + u t are equal to the autocovariances of y t "(see Watson, 1993 Watson, , p. 1015 ). This setup implies that the di¤erence between the model and the data can be expressed as
where G u (z) is the covariance generating function for the di¤erence between the model and the data.
To obtain the various covariance functions requires that we (i) estimate G y (z) from the data; (ii) calculate G x (z) from the model; (iii) choose G xy (z) to minimize the variance of u t , subject to the constraint that G xy (z) is positive semi-de…nite. 24 With these calculations in place, we can then derive Watson's RMSAE. More speci…cally we compute the ratio of the autospectrum of u j to the autospectrum of y j :
This measure is conceptually similar to the unexplained variance of a standard regression. Although it is not bounded between zero and unity, smaller values do imply a better model approximation to the data that larger ones. Finally, note that in all the results reported below, for any variable j, we use the entire range of the spectrum, i.e. [ ].
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To assess the statistical signi…cance of the …t measure, we generate 1000 replications for each model (non-parametric bootstrap). Based on these replications, we obtain the empirical distribution for the …t measure given in (13), which we then compare with the performance of the baseline model ( = = g = p = 0). To calculate the model spectrum including output, consumption, investment, government expenditure and hours of work from the full calibrated model spectrum (12 variables), we use a (5 12) selection matrix E with ones in the appropriate position such that F x (!) = EF 12 12 (!)E 0 .
27 24 In other words, the spectrum, F xy (!), is positive semi-de…nite. 25 The spectrum is given as Hamilton, 1994 , Sections 3.6, 10.3). 26 Note that this measure can also be calculated at any frequency ! or between desired ranges [! 1 ; ! 2 ] . Since all variables are equally important when calculating the "goodness of …t" measure, we weight them equally (see, e.g. Watson 1993, p. 1018). 27 We follow Uhlig (1999) and …lter the model spectrum using the power transfer function of the HP-…lter with the same smoothing weight as the data.
Christiano et al. (2005) measure of …t
which is minimized with respect to the parameter vector . We use it to compare the four versions of the model (adjustment cost, habits, wage rigidity, full model) with the baseline RBC model. The matrix V has the variances of the data impulse-responses on the diagonal. In our case, they are calculated from 1000 non-parametric bootstrap replications of the estimated VAR. The model impulse responses are calculated in the same way as the model spectrum, using a (5 12) selection matrix E with ones in the appropriate position.
Results: autocovariance functions
The results reported in Tables 2a-2c are in percent di¤erences from the baseline RBC model. Accordingly, a positive value denotes the percent improvement in …t across models and vice-versa for negative values. The numbers in parentheses are the bootstrap standard errors. 28 The sign of the results for the French case indicate (excluding adjustment costs for all variables expect hours) an improvement in …t for all variables and all models. Note that the full model …t is uniformly better than the base with the largest gains accruing to b h t and b g t followed by b y t , b c t b i t and b w t . In the German case, adjustment costs again do not improve model …t relative to the base but as in the French case, there is a statistically signi…cant improvement in …t for all other variables across the remaining models (except hours in the habits model). Comparing the full model …t in Table 2b with that in Tables 2a and 2c reveals that the improvement in model …t for the full model is, on average, quantitatively the largest for Germany followed by France and the U.K. respectively. Finally, the U.K. case appears to follow a similar pattern to the French and German results. In particular, the adjustment costs model leads to a signi…cant deterioration in …t for all variables except b i t and b c t (which are not signi…cant, ns) and to a worse …t for hours in the habits model. Otherwise, the remaining results show a statistically signi…cant improvement in …t for all variables and models.
Overall the results in Table 2 provide an interesting picture and some empirical support for several of our key modelling choices. First, the presence of both real wage rigidity and habits (except for hours) improves model …t for all countries both in the marginal and full model cases. Second, despite adjustment costs not performing well when considered in isolation, they do not adversely a¤ect the full model results.
Results: impulse response functions
To obtain the measures of …t reported in Table 3 , we examine the percent di¤erence between (see equation 14) for each of our four model speci…ca-tions and the for the baseline RBC model. Since lower values of imply a better …t between the model and data impulse responses than higher ones, negative values in Table 3 imply the model under consideration …ts the data better than the baseline RBC model. It is worth noting that the ACF based measure of …t, calculated in Table 2 , is broadly analogous to an overall measure of …t in standard regression analysis and the impulse responses based measure reported below is akin to partial measures of …t. Hence the two measures should be interpreted as complements and not substitutes.
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The broad message across all three countries is that the marginal models for adjustment costs (except for b g t in France, b c t and b w t in Germany and the U.K.) and habits (except for b i t in the U.K.) do not improve the model …t for the impulse response based measure. However the sticky real wage and full models appear to …t better than the base RBC model for the majority of variables for each country.
If we concentrate on the full model in Tables 2 and 3 , the preponderance of evidence is supportive of our key modeling choices. Accordingly, based on these …ndings, the stylized facts regarding the key sources of persistence for France, Germany and the U.K. and the general modelling practice in the DSGE literature, we retain each source of rigidity in the analysis which follows. 
Model vs empirical impulse response functions
To shed further light on the properties of the model relative to the data over the business cycle range, we next present the full model's responses to a one-percent shock to technology (see Figure 1) . The sub-plots in Figure 1 are constructed using the same set of variables contained in Tables (2a-3c ) and include plots of the 95-percent con…dence regions for both the model and data VAR impulse response functions. 29 These regions are useful for establishing whether there is a statistically signi…cant di¤erence between the impulse response functions of the model and the data. The light and dark grey regions in the …gures represent the model and the data respectively. If the regions do not overlap, as shown by white space between the grey regions, then we can conclude that there is a signi…cant di¤erence between the model and the data.
[ Figure 1 here]
The results reported in Figure 1 generally suggest that the data VAR contains relatively more cyclical responses to the technology shock whereas the model's responses are relatively more persistent. However, despite these differences, there are only two instances where the two sets of impulse response functions signi…cantly di¤er. These occur for the wage rate in France at lags 1-2 and also in the U.K. at lag 1. Thus the model impulse responses do not appear to be inconsistent with the data as depicted by the VAR model.
Welfare and Fiscal Stabilization
We now turn to a formal welfare ranking of the two policy regimes (i.e. passive versus active) to determine whether policymakers should act or not and, if so, by how much and to which state variable. To carry out this analysis, we …rst solve for a compensating consumption supplement that can make welfare equal in the two policy regimes (see, e.g. Lucas (1990) ). The value of this supplement will provide us with a measure of the welfare di¤erence between the two policy regimes expressed as a share of private consumption. To calculate this requires a measure of aggregate welfare (de…ned as expected discounted lifetime utility) under passive and active policy. We will follow two approaches to obtain these measures, both based on the popular linearquadratic local tradition. Then, with these measures in place, we will subject the model to a series of stochastic productivity shocks (i.e. 1000 per experiment) to understand the quantitative welfare implications of moving from passive to active …scal policy. In light of the necessary condition for …scal solvency, we will evaluate one instrument and one target per experiment.
Compensating consumption supplement
Let W p denote the expected discounted lifetime utility that the household enjoys under passive policy, and W a denote the same under active policy other things equal. When variables are re-expressed in stationary form (see our notation in sub-section 2.5), and since Z t = z t , equations (1) and (2) imply:
where the superscripts j = p; a denote outcomes under the passive and active policy regime respectively, and 0 < e z (1 2 )(1 ) < 1. Working as in e.g. Lucas (1990) , we assume a compensating consumption supplement at each date t under the active policy regime that is proportional by to private consumption under the passive reference regime and makes W a = W p . Thus, is such that:
The relationship between welfare in the active and passive cases can then be given by:
Therefore, if > 0, there is a welfare gain of moving from passive to active policy and vice versa for < 0. But to obtain an estimate of , we …rst need to obtain estimates of W a and W p : To do so, we will use two measures of welfare.
A …rst welfare measure (socially optimal steadystate)
We start by applying the welfare measure introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . The advantage of this approach is that it addresses a wellrecognized problem that a second-order approximation of the within-period utility function may not be consistent with a …rst-order approximation to the equilibrium solution of the endogenous variables due to the presence of linear (deviation) terms in the former (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, and Woodford, 2003, pp. 383-7).
To derive a purely quadratic approximation to utility (see equation (C:14) in the Appendix), the method requires that the long-run equilibrium, around which we approximate, is socially optimal. That is, in the long-run, the economy reproduces the real allocations of the social planner. This is achieved by deriving a set of policy rules for the long-run DCE economy which mimics the allocations of the social planner's. 30 In our setup, this is achieved in the steady-state by: (i) using an output subsidy to o¤set the distortion resulting from the income tax (see equation (C:11a)); (ii) using a consumption tax rate to o¤set the distortion from not internalizing habit persistence in the decentralized solution (see equation (C:11b)); 31 and (iii) setting public consumption and public investment, as shares of output, to their socially optimal values (see equations C:10j and C:10k). We then use the times-paths of private consumption, leisure and public consumption, as derived by solving the …rst-order approximate system in Appendix B 32 , and substitute them into (C:14) to obtain the expected discounted lifetime utility.
A second welfare measure (distorted steady-state)
We also obtain estimates of W a and W p ; and hence , by working in the area of the distorted long-run DCE. The advantage of using this measure of welfare, in contrast to the one described above, is that a distorted steady-state is a more realistic point around which to approximate welfare. Moreover, given that the e¤ects of distortions on welfare increase with the size of distortions, we expect the welfare e¤ects of active vs. passive policy to be relatively 30 The same procedure has been used in various forms by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and more recently by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) who use the output subsidy to undo the distortion resulting from monopolistic power in the long-run. 31 Recall that the wage setting equation (8) is speci…ed so that there are no wage distortions in the long-run. 32 This approximation is also taken around the steady-state of the social planner.
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higher when using this method. 33 To obtain this measure of welfare (see equation (D:1) in the Appendices), so that it is comparable with (C:14), we derive a second-order approximation to utility around the steady-state of the DCE derived in Appendix A. We then use the times-paths of private consumption, leisure and public consumption, as derived by solving the …rst-order approximate system in Appendix B 34 , and substitute them into (D:1) to obtain the expected discounted lifetime utility.
Welfare results
Before we apply the above two welfare measures, recall that the policy instruments that respond to innovations in the state of the economy are public consumption and public investment as shares of output (see equations (12a b) above). Moreover, these two shares are linked to the output gap and the public debt-to-output target. The detailed results reported below concentrate on the former policy instrument and target only, since public investment yielded negligible welfare results quantitatively 35 and the debt target led to local indeterminacy 36 across a large range of reaction coe¢ -cients considered. 33 We are grateful to the Editor and an anonymous referee for suggesting this measure. 34 This approximation is also taken around the steady-state of the DCE. 35 Perhaps this occurs because its output share is small in all three countries. Also, changes in public investment have direct allocation e¤ects that mitigate any potential stabilizing bene…ts. 36 This happens because reaction to public debt requires a stronger countercyclical action than reaction to the output gap. To understand this, consider equation (12a): Say that y t is above its long-run value and the government has to reduce public spending as share of output to slow the economy. Ceteris paribus, this can happen even if g t rises; we only need the ratio g t =y t to fall; and vice versa when y t is below its long-run value. Now say that b t =y t is above its long-run target. Ceteris paribus (i.e. given y t ), the required fall in g t =y t implies a fall in g t ; and vice versa when b t =y t is below its long-run target. In other words, the required countercyclical action in g t is stronger when we respond to the debt target than to the output gap. Given this, it is not surprising that reaction to debt creates indeterminacy problems (see also Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997 who …nd that more countercyclical policies have a greater likelihood of being indeterminate in equilibrium). 37 Note that for the solution linearized around the social planner's steady-state, the only possible values of g b0 and g b1 which lead to saddle-path stable solutions are zero. In contrast, for the solution around the distorted steady-state, saddle-path stability can be found for parameter con…gurations containing non-zero debt reactions in 12.8, 8 and 16 percent of the cases for France, Germany and the UK respectively. Since we aim to focus on "implementable" rules (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007, p. 1704), we exclude further consideration of the debt target. By focusing only on policies which robustly deliver unique equilibria, we avoid potential dilemmas for policy makers who might inadvertently
Welfare and size of policy reaction (current output gaps)
Using equations (C:14); which is around the socially optimal steady-state, and (D:1), which is around the distorted steady-state, we …rst report the welfare implications of active versus passive policy in Figures 2 and 3 respectively (using government consumption as a share of output to respond to the current output gap). Figure 2 suggests that the welfare gains from countercyclical …scal action are highest for Germany followed by France and then by the U.K.. Moreover, the welfare gains for each country increase monotonically in the range we consider for higher values of the policy reaction coe¢ cient, with the highest ones being experienced when g y0 = 0:2: The rank ordering of welfare gains suggested by Figure 2 is expected and consistent with the extent of non-internalized market distortions along the transition path to the socially optimum long-run in each country. For example, examination of Table 1 reveals that Germany has the highest wage rigidity. 38 
[Figures 2 and 3 here]
If we now turn to results in the area of the distorted long-run in Figure 3 , the …rst thing to note is that the welfare gains from countercyclical …scal action are greater than their corresponding values in Figure 2 . The larger welfare gains in Figure 3 can be explained by the fact that more noninternalised distortions are at work relative to the socially optimal case in Figure 2 . These di¤erences in distortions are now present both in the steadystate and along the transition path. For example, consumption habits were internalized in the steady-state of Figure 2 , but are not in the steady-state of Figure 3 . In addition, public spending is not optimally determined, and the distortions associated with the income and consumption taxes are not undone, in the steady-state of Figure 3 . Finally, tax rates are not at their socially optimal values along the transition path in Figure 3 . 39 Another interesting contrast between Figures 2 and 3 is that the crosscountry ordering of welfare gains from active policy changes. For example in Figure 3 , the U.K. gains the most instead of the least, whilst the German gains are still greater than the French. A possible explanation for the change in the U.K. position around the distorted long-run case is that (with ad hoc policies and with a relatively small size of government sector) its ability parameterize a non-implementable rule. 38 Recall that the other non-internalised market distortion, habits, are calibrated to the same value for all countries, i.e. = 0:7.
39 Note however that there are market distortions (wage persistence and consumption habits) along the transition path in both Figures 1 and 2. 26 for automatic stabilization is lower than in both France and Germany. For instance, all of its spending shares and tax rates (see Table 1 above), are relatively lower than the corresponding magnitudes in France and Germany. Then, in Figure 3 , since automatic stabilizers can do relatively less work in the U.K. than in the other two countries considered, there is more scope for gains from active policy intervention for the U.K.. In other words, although the U.K. is the least distorted economy in our setup, it is in most need of countercyclical …scal action because of inadequate automatic stabilizers. 40 Germany still bene…ts more than France since it is more distorted (at both the market and policy level). In other words, despite its bigger government size and automatic stabilizers, Germany's distortions also necessitate a stronger active policy intervention than in France. It should be pointed out that the government size plays its conventional automatic stabilizing role only in Figure 3 , where policies are exogenous. This di¤ers from the case in Figure  2 , where the analysis was around a solution in which the government size was optimally chosen on e¢ ciency grounds in a non-stochastic non-distorted long-run environment.
Welfare and size of policy reaction (current and lagged output gaps)
To further explore the welfare implications of active versus passive …scal policy, we next use the public consumption reaction function with both current and lagged output gaps (see (12a) above). These results are reported in Table 4 . The …rst thing to note is that welfare gains increase when we react to both gaps and raise the degree of reaction, at least in the range of parameter values reported here. Note that the magnitude of peak welfare gains (in bold) are substantially higher for each country across both welfare measures. Further, note that the within-and across-measure country welfare rankings are the same as reported in Figures 2 and 3 . Also, welfare around the optimal steady-state are lower than their corresponding values around the distorted one, again as in Figures 2 and 3 . Thus, it appears that reasonable sized welfare gains can be expected when business cycle ‡uctuations, induced by TFP shocks, are smoothed by using a reaction function for public consumption that takes account of both current and past output gaps. The magnitude of welfare gains from countercyclical action are quite small when evaluated around the socially optimum long-run (e.g. they reach 0.008% of private consumption for Germany), but noticeably larger when evaluated around the distorted long-run (e.g. they reach 0.278% of private consumption for the U.K.). We report that the e¤ects in the distorted longrun case can rise to nearly 1% of consumption when a permanent 1% productivity shock is considered instead of the temporary one applied in Table 4 . 41 We are aware, of course, that there can be combinations of distortions that may produce bigger quantitative e¤ects depending on the model considered. Heathcote (2005) , for instance, studies the e¤ects of changes in tax policy in an economy with heterogeneous agents and credit constraints and …nds substantial e¤ects on aggregate consumption. However, it is worth noting that he focuses on consumption and partly on investment, while our study is based on welfare that is a¤ected by more endogenous variables and hence contains more compositional e¤ects. For instance, stabilizing one variable may be achieved at the cost of destabilizing another. To shed further light into the quantitative relationship between potential welfare gains from active policy and market distortions, we next condition on …xed values of the reaction coe¢ cients (i.e. 0.2 for both the current and lagged-once output gap) and allow wage rigidity, , to vary in the vicinity of the base calibration reported in Table 1 . 42 Figures 4 and 5 show respectively the case around the socially optimal steady-state and the case around the distorted steady-state. Note that, in these experiments, the three countries have exactly the same degree of non-internalized market distortions, so they di¤er only in policy distortions, government size and other technologypreferences characteristics. The main result is that the higher is , the higher the gain from active policy in all three countries. This result is intuitive, i.e. the higher the degree of a particular market distortion, the stronger the argument for countercyclical policy action.
[Figures 4-5 here]
Concerning the cross-country ordering of welfare gains from active policy, Figure 4 is like Figure 2 , although the magnitude of welfare di¤erences across countries is smaller than in Figure 2 . In Figure 4 , di¤erences in welfare are driven by country characteristics other than wage and consumption rigidities. In Figure 5 , welfare gains from active policy are highest for Germany again, while the U.K. gains are now greater than the French. Germany seems to be the most distorted economy, even when we assume that non-internalized market distortions are the same. The U.K. bene…ts more than France because active …scal action makes up for inadequate automatic stabilizers, as discussed in Figure 3 .
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied two of the main responsibilities of the government, namely the stabilization of the macroeconomy, as well as the re-allocation of resources via the provision of public goods and services, in the EU-3.
To this end, we developed a DSGE model which (i) allowed …scal policy instruments to react to two key fundamentals, i.e. cyclical output and public debt; (ii) justi…ed feedback policy by assuming real wage rigidity, which is widely believed to be one of the main scleroses in Europe, and persistence in consumption habits; (iii) deliberately employed a minimal setup where 42 To conserve space, we do not report the experiment for habits as well, since the welfare gains are quantitative negligible for higher values of in the optimal case and can actually fall slightly in the distorted case. To explain the latter …nding recall that (i) in the long run, private consumption, and hence utility, decrease in (see the expression for small u in the Appendix under C.2); (ii) consumption habits and the e¤ects of are not internalized (as they are in the area of the long run socially optimum); and (iii) since active policy tries to close the gap between current values and long-run values, and long-run utility decreases with ; it is natural that lifetime utility also decreases with : the only distorting e¤ect from the part of policy was the non-availability of lump-sum policy instruments; (iv) studied how each …scal policy instrument, as well as the choice between an output gap target and a public …nance target, (de)stabilize the economy, where by stabilization we mean both the internal stability of the system and the standard deviation of macroeconomic variables when the economy is subjected to supply shocks; (v) calculated the general equilibrium welfare di¤erence when moving from passive to active policy for each policy instrument and each target.
The main policy messages arising from our study are that (i) policymakers should avoid using tax rates for countercyclical policy because it usually leads to indeterminacy; (ii) reaction to a public debt-to-ouput target can also lead to indeterminacy or produce negligible welfare bene…ts; (iii) using public investment for stabilization also yields negligible welfare bene…ts, probably because its output share is very small in the data; (iv) the most e¤ective instrument-target combination is to use public consumption spending, as a share of output, to stabilize the output gap; (v) the higher the degree of a wage rigidity, the stronger the argument for countercyclical …scal action; and (vi) since active policy and automatic stabilizers are substitutes, it is possible that relatively undistorted economies may be in much need of countercyclical …scal action because of inadequate automatic stabilizers.
A natural extension is to introduce more distortions (at market and/or policy level) and reevaluate the desirability of active versus passive policy. In general, the design of tax-spending policies, and in particular the policy instruments and targets (if any) for the government to use in an attempt to …ne-tune the economy, remains at the heart of macroeconomics. is: where e z (1 2 )(1 ) : 43 As discussed in the text, consistent with the SGP, we set b = 0:6y in the long run. This implies that, one of the other …scal policy instruments has to become endogenous to satisfy the government budget constraint. Here we choose, to residually determine government transfers as a share of GDP, g tr 0 .
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Appendix B: 1st-order approximate DCE
We take a …rst-order Taylor series expansion of the stationary DCE in sub-sections 2.5 and 2.6 around steady-state to obtain the following …rst-order representation:
3)
(B:4)
(B:5) ' ln(x t =x) b x t is a …rst-order Taylor approximation and x is the long-run value of x t . Note that (B:11) de…nes an auxiliary variable used for lagged-once consumption in (B:5):
Log-linearizing the stationary laws of motion for the …scal policy instruments in sub-section 2.6 around the steady-state yields 44 :
b g 
where g c = g c 0 y and g i = g i 0 y. It is straightforward to show that equations (C:4 C:7) imply that we have for b c t in a second-order approximation: 
